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INTRODUCTION
Knowledge has become a crucial asset in modern production systems, and its creation has 
become  a  key process  in  order  to  sustain  or  increase  competitiveness.  The  ensuing  shift 
toward  a  knowledge-based  economy  has  amplified  research  interests  in  geographical 
clustering  of  firms,  for  geographical  proximity  is  supposed  to  ease  inter-organizational 
learning.
Indeed, there is substantial  empirical  evidence claiming that firms located in geographical 
clusters are more likely to learn and innovate than isolated firms (Audretsch and Feldman 
1996; Baptista and Swann 1998; Baptista 2000; Wennberg and Lindqvist 2008). However, 
this renewed attention to the subject of geographical proximity highlights how far we are from 
having a clear understanding of its influence on inter-organizational learning and innovation 
(Boschma 2005;  Torre  and Gilly  2000).  In  general,  geographical  proximity  per  se is  not 
considered a sufficient condition for learning to take place (Boschma 2005: 62), though it is 
clearly able to strengthen other factors that facilitate learning processes (Boschma 2005; Boari 
et al. 2004; Breschi and Lissoni 2005; Greeve 2005). Many scholars starting from different 
perspectives converge to agree that all concurring factors should be related to one another in 
order to construct a theory of clustering processes  where learning  has a key role (Torre and 
Rallet 2005; Knoben and Oerlemans 2006; Malmberg and Maskell 2002: 429). 
This  paper  aims  to  make  a  contribution  by  investigating  the  relationships  between 
geographical  proximity  and  rivalry  with  respect  to  inter-organizational  learning  and 
knowledge creation. This is quite unusual in the literature, for most theoretical developments 
and empirical tests have focused on inter-firm cooperation, whereas far less attention has been 
paid to the interplay of geographical proximity, rivalry and learning processes. 
 This  orientation  is  quite  surprising,  for  rivalry  is  at  the  very  heart  of  the  concept  of 
geographical  cluster  as  a  spatially  concentrated  group  of  firms  that  operate  in  the  same 
industry. Indeed, claims that “knowledge in clusters is created through increased competition 
and intensified rivalry” (Malmberg and Power 2005: 412) are widely shared.
In our contribution, we wish to explore the relationships between rivalry and geographical 
proximity at the very level of contacts between individual firms. In particular, we wish to 
highlight the influence of geographical proximity on rival identification, on the comparison of 
their knowledge, and on the consequent elaboration of a strategy.
Our firms are assumed to be sufficiently small to be led by one single decision-maker. Thus, 
all  concerns  regarding  individual  bounded  rationality  apply  straightforwardly  to 
organizational decision-making.
In order to reproduce the interactions between firms, we made use of an agent-based model 
where  the  strategic  choices  of  rival  firms  are  derived  from  general  assumptions  on 
competitive  behavior  and learning  processes.  Aim of  the  model  is  to  investigate  the  co-
evolution of firms’ knowledge, strategies and performances. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The second section provides the theoretical and 
conceptual framework of our work. The third section explains the elements of the model. The 
fourth section illustrates the experiments and their results. The fifth section concludes.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
 
According to Sorenson and Baum (2003) the last few years have witnessed a rapid rise in 
interest in the topics of place and space in the social sciences. Economists, sociologists and 
strategy  scholars  have  become  particularly  interested  in  studying  the  implications  of  the 
spatial distribution of firms for economic growth as well as its consequences on knowledge 
production and diffusion. In general, their assumption is that a critical mass of co-localized 
firms can promote knowledge production and circulation (Cowan, Jonard and Ozman 2004).
In particular, economic geographers have pointed out a need to understand the relationship 
between  geographic  proximity  and  the  processes  of  localized  learning  and  innovation,  a 
relationship that has been overseen in the economic conceptualization of knowledge as an 
externality that spreads pervasively within a spatially bounded area (Giuliani 2007) and can 
be easily reproduced (Cowan, Jonard and Ozman 2004). A reconsideration of the nature of 
knowledge and of the problems connected to its reproduction and diffusion has increased the 
concern about other non-spatial  dimensions of proximity relevant in promoting knowledge 
production and circulation (Boschma 2005; Breschi and Lissoni 2005; Knoben and Oelemans 
2006; Greeve 2005). While geographic proximity is the least ambiguous concept involved 
(Knoben and Oerlemans 2006), its explanatory power has been reduced by the possibility that 
organizational and relational proximities surrogate its effects (Gallaud and Torre 2005; Torre 
and Rallet 2005) shows. These different dimensions of proximity should be better specified 
and related to one another (Boschma 2005: 62; Greeve 2005).
Contrary to economics, the strategic perspective has rarely considered geographical proximity 
per  se as  a  factor  enabling  learning  processes.  Rather,  it  has  considered  geographical 
proximity as a dimension promoting other mechanisms, such as cooperation and rivalry, that 
may facilitate learning processes. These mechanisms are at the very heart of the concept of a 
geographical cluster as a spatially concentrated group of firms that compete in the same or 
related  industries  and are  connected through a  set  of vertical  and horizontal  relationships 
(Porter 1990, 1998). 
Although this  general  framework addresses both cooperation  and competition,  researchers 
mainly focused their attention on inter-firm cooperation induced by geographical proximity - 
see Knoben and Oerlemans (2006) for an extensive review - and its consequences on learning 
processes (Dyer and Nobeka 2000; Doz 1996; Inkpen 1998; Inkpen and Crossan 1995; Kale, 
Singh and Perlmutter 2000; Khanna, Gulati and Nohoria 1998; Powell 1998; Simonin 1999). 
Far  less  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  impact  of  geographical  proximity  on  rivalry  and 
competition,  as  well  as  on  their  combined  consequences  on  organizational  learning  and 
innovation. The only exceptions – which do not address the issue of geographical proximity, 
anyway – are the studies on inter-organizational  collaborations among rivals  and learning 
processes (Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell 2000). 
These  considerations  suggested  us  to  focus  on  rivalry.  More  specifically,  the  ensuing 
subsections deal first with the relationship between geographical proximity and rivalry and, 
subsequently, with the relationship between rivalry and learning.
Geographical proximity and the identification of rivals
On the relationship between geographical proximity and rivalry, scholars have expressed two 
opposite views. On the one hand, long-term observers of industrial clusters have noted that 
clustered firms exhibit more competition than non-clustered firms (Becattini 1990; Dei Ottati 
1994;  Enright  1991).  In  fact,  according  to  the  theory  of  industrial  organization  rivalry 
involves a large number of local firms committed to a fight of all against all (Piore and Sabel 
1984). Allegedly, this contributes to the competitive advantage of a geographical area and of 
the firms clustered on it (Porter 1990, 1998; Porter, Sakakibara and Takeuchi, 2000).
On  the  other  hand,  researchers  from  the  resource-based  view  claimed  that  geographical 
proximity allows an extreme division of labor within the cluster,  and consequently,  firms 
specialization.  Thus,  this  reasoning  suggests  that  rivalry  is  limited  to  a  few competitors 
(Lazerson  and  Lorenzoni  1999).  Unfortunately,  both  interpretations  lack  any  empirical 
verification.
A further source of confusion is the fact that too many researchers on geographical clusters 
have taken rivalry and competition as synonyms. In reality, since the early days of economic 
thinking  the  term  competition  has  been  used  to  identify  firms  that  depend  on  the  same 
resources (Baum and Korn 1996: 225). On the contrary,  rivalry has been interpreted as a 
conscious struggle by each individual firm to establish its own supremacy in a specific market 
(Scherer and Ross 1990). Thus, rivalry and competition do not necessarily coincide.
Competition has been neglected because it is an “under-socialized” phenomenon occurring 
among actors that are anonymous to each other (Lomi and Larsen 1996: 1293). Competition 
would be determined by market forces not subject to the conscious control of individual firms 
(Baum and  Korn  1996:  225).  Consequently,  it  would  not  be  influenced  by  geographical 
proximity (Torre and Gilly 2000).
However, rivalry does not deserve the same treatment. Albeit of the same relational nature 
(Baum and Korn 1999; Korn and Baum 1999) as market interactions between dyads of firms 
(Chen and McMillan 1992; Chen 1996: 100), rivalry depends on firm-specific competitive 
conditions (Baum and Korn 1996). 
Among the two separate approaches to the study of rivalry,  the rational-economic and the 
cognitive  managerial  (Baldwin  and  Bengtsson  2004;  Chen  1996;  Miller  and  Chen  1996; 
Farjoun and Lai 1997), it is the last one which contributed to the exploration of the role of 
geographical  proximity  as  an  explicit  and  implicit  criterion  to  “market  construction”. 
According to Porac and Rosa (1996: 372), “Defining rivals is not so much a matter of overt 
behavior as it is one of managerial attention and discrimination”, and also, “Rivalry occurs 
when one firm orients  toward another and considers the actions and characteristics of the 
other  in  business  decisions,  with the goal  of  achieving  a  commercial  advantage  over  the 
other”  (Porac,  Thomas,  Wilson,  Paton  and  Kanfer  1995).  Consequently,  rivalry  implies 
mutual recognition and only occurs between paired organizations that are each identifiable by 
the other one (Lomi and Larsen 1996: 1293). 
In rivalry,  but not in  competition,  cognitive processes matter.  Whilst  competitors  may be 
regarded as a nebulous collective actor, rivals must be identified and comparisons with each 
of them must be made. Cognitive processes make  rivalry a localized phenomenon. In fact, 
several authors (Baum and Haveman 1997; Baum and Mezias 1992; Gripsrud and Gronhaug 
1985; Lant  and  Baum 1995; Porac et al. 1995) claim that firms are most likely to identify 
neighboring competitors as rivals. A quite common explanation is the observability argument 
(Cyert  and March 1963), claiming that geographically proximate firms are most likely to be 
noticed and observed because proximity increases the availability of information and provides 
an incentive to attend to it (Porac et al. 1995). 
However, Boari, Odorici and Zamarian (2003) did not find such a simple relation between 
rivalry  and  geographical  proximity.  These  authors  showed  that,  in  an  Italian  cluster  of 
producers of packaging machines, rivals were not necessarily selected among the competitors 
within the cluster. On the contrary, most rivals were identified among firms located outside 
the cluster. However, they also found that whenever firms did not cite any local rival, the total 
number of rivals they gave was consistently smaller.  Thus, their research suggested a more 
complex relationship between geographical proximity and rivals identification.  
Boari, Espa, Odorici and Zamarian (2004) advanced the idea that sharing geographical space 
with  rivals may  help  to  extend  managerial  representations,  spreading  entrepreneurs’ 
monitoring attention  over a larger  number  of rivals.  This  can be readily explained if  one 
accepts that geographical proximity eases the consideration of rivals, and that entrepreneurs 
are boundedly rational decision-makers. Then, their fixed amount of cognitive resources can 
be either employed to attend a large number of geographically proximate rivals, or a small 
number of geographically distant rivals, or any combination of both.
Geographical proximity and learning processes
The relationship  between  rivalry  and learning  has  been  neglected  by the  majority  of  the 
literature on inter-organizational learning (Ingram 2002; Kim and Miner 2007). In fact, in the 
few studies on the impact of rivalry on learning, rivals have been aggregated (Ingram and 
Baum 1997;  Aharonson, Baum and Feldman 2007).  On the contrary,  dyadic  relationships 
should be considered (Darr and Kurzberg 2000).
However, the studies on inter-organizational learning and, before them, those on vicarious 
learning  – i.e., induced by others’ experiences –  (Bandura 1977; Manz and Sims 1981; Gioia 
and Manz 1986) are indirect references to rivalry. A notable finding of these studies is that 
when learning is stimulated by the experiences of others, similarity is an orienting principle to 
choose from whom to learn (Darr and Kurtzberg 2000). In fact, similarity reduces information 
uncertainty  (Farjoun and  Lai  1997)  creating  a  context  of  understanding.  Since  rivals  are 
similar, their experiences are naturally salient (Ingram 2002). 
In particular, strategic similarities such as market overlap and product commonality are useful 
to identify the competitive arena and to influence information flows and learning processes 
(Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller 1989). Similarity in strategy is expected to have its greatest 
impact  on knowledge transfer  (Darr  and Kurtzberg 2000),  at  least  because  it  is  the main 
criterion to identify a set of comparable firms that offer experiences useful to define one’s 
own behavior and role (White 1981; White and Eccles 1987).  
Cognitive distance is still another type of similarity, which is crucial to identify the rivals to 
imitate. Cognitive distance measures the different way to perceive, interpret and evaluate the 
world by two actors (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). The notable feature of cognitive distance is 
that it neither be to high nor to low for learning to take place. In fact, too high a cognitive 
distance means that the two actors have so different mental categories that each of them is 
unable to understand what the other is doing. At the other extreme, too low cognitive distance 
means that the two actors are so similar, that they have nothing to learn from one another. 
The attention paid by many scholars to the concept  of similarity implicitly concedes that, 
through monitoring and comparison, rivalry influences the learning processes (Malmberg and 
Maskell 2006). However, some scholars have expressed doubts about the quality of what can 
be learned from rivals. First of all, rivalry discounts the idea that learning from the experience 
of  others  may  be  less  important  than  learning  by  direct  search  and  experimentation. 
Moreover, learning by monitoring and comparing (as in rivalry) is considered to contribute 
less valuable knowledge with respect to learning by interacting (as in collaboration) (Lane 
and  Lubatkin  1998).  In  fact,  establishing  comparability  through  sharing  of  strategic  and 
cognitive  repertoires  is  supposed  to  give  access  only  to  codified  knowledge,  whereas 
interacting with the other organizations may allow to understand the more tacit components of 
knowledge. 
Geographical proximity is supposed to ease learning. Boari,  Odorici  and Zamarian (2003) 
suggest that the depth of the comparison with rivals increases with the geographical proximity 
of  rivals.  Geographical  proximity  could  increase  the  variety  that  firms  perceive  in  the 
environment (Nooteboom 2006) and enlarge the number of strategic aspects that firms takes 
in consideration (Bogner and Thomas 1993). In fact, when firms observe distant rivals the 
complexity of their cognitive representations gets lost (Morgan 2004), both because distance 
weakens the collection of information and their interpretation (Ghoshal and Kim 1986) and 
because it decreases the speed of any response (Yu and Cannella 2007). 
However, some authors suggest that geographical proximity may have a negative side effect. 
In fact, if learning is limited to proximate rivals, myopia is likely to ensue (Levitt and March 
1988; Levinthal and March 1993).
THE  MODEL
 
We constructed a model of competitive interactions between clustered firms that enlarge or 
shrink their knowledge while undertaking strategic actions with respect to their rivals. This 
section  illustrates  the  building  blocks  of  our  model  and,  in  its  final  part,  how  they  are 
connected to one another.
The knowledge of firms
We assumed that  knowledge articulates  into  knowledge fields.  Each knowledge field  is  a 
combination of a product and a market. For instance, if a firm produces one product A for two 
markets 1 and 2, this knowledge is expressed by two knowledge fields: one for the product A 
and market 1, the other of the product A and market 2.
Figure  (1)  illustrates  knowledge  fields  as  parallelepipeds  composed  by  a  product  and  a 
market. The number of knowledge fields owned by a firm is not constant with time. In fact, 
firms can start to operate in a new field, or they can leave a field if their managers deem that it 
is no longer worth pursuing.  However,  since we are modeling small  firms with a limited 
managerial  attention implied by human bounded rationality (Simon 1947), we assume the 
existence of a threshold on the maximum number of knowledge fields that a firm can manage.
Figure 1. A firm’s knowledge is entailed in knowledge fields, represented by parallelepipeds. 
Each knowledge field spans a product and a market. The height of a parallelepiped represents 
the depth of knowledge in a specific field.
Knowledge fields are characterized by a depth. The depth of a knowledge field owned by a 
firm represents how good a firm is in that field. In figure (1), depth is represented by the 
heights of parallelepipeds.
The depth of knowledge decays with time or, conversely, is increased by efforts to develop 
in-house knowledge or by the imitation of rivals. Our model reconstructs the efforts to create, 
imitate and deepen knowledge fields against a natural tendency of knowledge to vanish with 
time.
The existence of a particular knowledge field, as well as its similarity to other knowledge 
fields, is common knowledge (Malmberg and Maskell 2002: 439). This means that all firms 
know that certain products exist and that they are sold in certain markets.
However, only the firm that owns a particular knowledge field knows its depth exactly. The 
other firms know only a fraction of this depth, depending on their geographical proximity. 
The further they are, the less they know concerning how a certain product is actually made 
and sold in a certain market (Bogner and Thomas 1993; Boari, Odorici and Zamarian 2003). 
We  assume  that  depth  decreases  linearly  from  its  original  value,  attained  at  maximum 
geographical  proximity,  down to  zero for  two firms  that  are  as  far  as  possible  from one 
another as it is allowed by the model.
Rivals identification and geographical proximity
Rival  firms  are  selected  among  those  firms  whose  knowledge  is  sufficiently  similar. 
Similarity is measured by pairwise comparison of one’s knowledge fields with those of a 
potential rival.
In particular, for each pair of knowledge fields it is observed whether they concern the same 
product (similarity ½), or they deal with the same market (similarity ½), or both (similarity 1). 
The sum of these numbers is normalized to the [0,1] interval to yield an index of the similarity 
of the knowledge of the two firms.
Our model rests on the assumption that considering a rival requires some cognitive effort by 
the main manager of a small firm, whose maximum cognitive effort is limited by her bounded 
rationality  (Simon  1947).  In  accordance  with  empirical  findings  by  Boari,  Odorici  and 
Zamarian (2003), the cognitive effort for entertaining a rival can be assumed to decrease with 
physical proximity.
We shall assume that each firm entertains a list of rivals such that the sum of the cognitive 
efforts  expended  to  entertain  them  is  lower  than  an  amount  specified  by  an  exogenous 
parameter. By this assumption, since cognitive effort decreases with physical proximity, firms 
who focus on geographically close rivals may typically consider a large number of rivals. 
This  result  is  in  accordance  with  our  preliminary  empirical  findings  (Boari,  Odorici  and 
Zamarian 2003). 
Cognitive distance from rivals
At each simulation step, a firm picks up a rival at random from its list of current rivals. For 
each pair constituted by one of its knowledge fields and one of the rival’s knowledge fields, it 
evaluates the cognitive distance between them.
The cognitive distance between two knowledge fields is measured by the extent to which 
knowledge  fields  do  not overlap:  Identical  knowledge  fields  have  cognitive  distance  0, 
knowledge  fields  with  identical  products  (markets)  but  different  markets  (products)  have 
cognitive distance ½, knowledge fields with different markets  and different products have 
cognitive distance 1.
Note  that  the  fewer  the rivals,  the less  likely  that  the evaluation  of  cognitive  distance  is 
different at each step. Conversely, firms with many rivals are more likely to measure diverse 
values of cognitive distance, depending on which rival they are picking up.
Evaluation of performance
Past  performances  are  considered  a  major  explanatory  variable  of  organizational  learning 
(Cyert and March 1963; Lenvinthal and March 1981). However, measuring performances of 
changing knowledge is not a trivial task. In fact, since the outcomes of innovative activities 
cannot be foreseen, ex-ante evaluation by means of utility functions makes little sense.
An alternative route is to conceive the usefulness of a piece of knowledge as deriving from its 
connections to other pieces of knowledge (Villani, Bonacini, Ferrari, Serra and Lane 2007). 
For instance, a possible explanation of the success of innovations is their ability to connect 
with other products creating new markets (see Actor Network Theory in the box). Following 
this interpretation, we are led to ascribe the performance of knowledge to its ability to bridge 
structural holes (Burt 1992).
Let  us  interpret  common  knowledge  as  a  directed  weighted  graph,  where  nodes  are 
knowledge fields and edges are common instances of business elements. Thus, the ability to 
bridge structural holes is measured by betweenness centrality:
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where  tsσ  is the number of minimum paths between node s and node t, while  tisσ  is the 
number of minimum paths between node s and node t passing through node i.
Figure  (2)  illustrates  a  network  of  knowledge fields,  each  composed  by a  product  and  a 
market. Knowledge fields are inscribed in dashed circles, which represent the firms that own 
them. A link is there whenever two knowledge fields concern the same product, or the same 
market. In general, the knowledge of a firm may span several fields. Occasionally, different 
firms may have the same knowledge field.
In  figure  (2),  firm ε  owns  knowledge  fields  that  constitute  the  only  bridge  between  the 
knowledge fields of firms α, β on the one side, and the knowledge fields of firms γ, δ on the 
other side. Thus, these knowledge fields are essential for the knowledge in the economy to be 
connected.  It  is  knowledge  fields  of  this  kind  that,  according  to  eq.(1),  have  a  high 
betweenness  centrality  and  therefore  a  high  performance.  On  the  contrary,  the  only 
knowledge field of firm γ has a low betweenness centrality.
Figure 2. A network of knowledge fields (solid squares) owned by firms (dashed circles). 
Products are labeled by letters A, B, C, D. Markets are labeled by numbers 1, 2, 3, 4. Firms 
are labeled by Greek letters α, β, γ, δ, ε.
Note that by measuring performance by means of betweeness centrality we never assign a 
positive performance to novel knowledge. In fact,  novel knowledge consists of creating a 
novel  product,  or  a  novel  market,  or  both.  Thus,  in  the  network of  knowledge fields  an 
innovative field corresponds to an isolated node or a node with one single link to the other 
nodes. In figure (2), the knowledge field owned by firm α is one such case.
Both theoretical reasons and empirical investigations suggest that innovations are made by 
applying old knowledge onto unchartered domains (Nooteboom 2000). Thus, henceforth we 
shall assume that novel knowledge fields are constructed either by creating a novel product or 
by creating  a novel  market,  but not both.  So all  nodes representing novel knowledge are 
created with one link to another node.
ACTOR  NETWORK  THEORY
Actor network theory (ANT) is a sociological theory where the development 
and acceptance of artefacts and technologies is understood in terms of the interests of 
various social actors. ANT stresses that different actors may have a different 
understanding of the properties and potentialities of novel artefacts and technologies; 
nonetheless, their interests may align to support a particular innovation. In their turn, 
artefacts and technologies change the balance of powers and the network of 
relationships between social actors. Equipped with this view, scholars working with 
ANT have provided historical reconstructions where the development of particular 
artefacts and technologies is described as the – sometimes unintended – consequence 
of the work of a large number of actors rather than the visionary plan of an isolated 
genius (Hughes, 1986).
In order to understand how ANT relates to our measure of performance, let us 
consider the following empirical investigations of successful innovations:
Law (1986) explained the rise of Portuguese ability to exert long-distance control in 
the XV century through certain simplifications of medieval astronomy that made it 
available to navigators, a new design of vessels that enabled them both to carry large 
freights and to resist armed attacks, and increased reliability of mariners through 
extensive drill. The Portuguese ability to exert control as distant as India would derive 
from the ability of a small committee set out by King John “The Navigator” to embed 
the results of medieval astronomy in a few simple tools that could be operated without 
prior knowledge of astronomy.
Latour (1988) described the rise of Louis Pasteur and the diffusion of vaccination as a 
collective outcome of several forces, of which the most important ones were the 
hygienist movement, that was seeking scientific support for its urban planning 
prescriptions, the surgeons, who could improve the effectiveness of their art by means 
of local disinfection, and the military, which did not want its soldiers to be decimated 
by tropical diseases. On the contrary, physicians opposed vaccination for several 
decades, until Pasteur proposed post-infection treatments and, most importantly, the 
State provided a role to physicians in the compulsory vaccination of the French 
population.
In both cases, we see one or a few actors – Louis Pasteur, King John and his 
astronomers – who were able to place themselves in a position from which they could 
exert a great influence because powerful allies are there to wait for their innovations – 
the hygienists in the case of Pasteur, the merchants with their improved vessels in the 
case of King John.
A consequence that we may drawn is that successful innovations are those that 
are able to bridge between existing bodies of knowledge. From this insight our choice 
follows, to measure the performance of a knowledge field by means of its betweenness 
centrality in a graph where nodes are knowledge fields, connected by edges if they 
have a product or a market in common – see e.g. figure (2).
Inter-organizational learning 
At each simulation step, the depth of knowledge fields decreases according to an exogenous 
decay  rate.  If  the  depth  of  a  knowledge  field  decreases  below a  minimum,  that  field  is 
canceled. However, a firm can increase the depth of its knowledge field, or it can even create 
new ones.
We distinguish four kinds of learning actions, that affect the depth of knowledge fields. The 
received literature makes the two following distinctions:
• Experiential  Learning can  be  distinguished  from  Vicarious  Learning (Bandura  1977; 
Manz  and  Sims  1981;  Gioia  and  Manz  1986).  While  the  former  rests  on  personal 
experience, the second takes place through the experience of someone else.
• Exploration of  novel  knowledge can  be  distinguished  from  Exploitation of  existing 
knowledge (March 1991).
Since these distinctions regard different aspects of learning, we can fruitfully cross them with 
one another as in figure (3). Experiential Exploration is the creation of novel knowledge out 
of personal experience. This knowledge is novel for its creator as for the whole economy. 
Vicarious Exploration occurs when a firm borrows a piece of knowledge from another firm, 
that is novel for it though it is not novel for in the economy. Experiential Exploitation occurs 
when  a  firm  deepens  its  existing  knowledge  disregarding  the  experience  of  other  firms. 
Finally,  Vicarious Exploitation occurs when a firm deepens its own knowledge by learning 
from the experience of other firms.
Figure  3.  Experiential  Exploration,  Experiential  Exploitation,  Vicarious  Exploration  and 
Vicarious Exploitation.
In our model, firms select one among the above actions according to the values attained by 
performance and cognitive distance. In particular, experiential learning is undertaken if either 
(i) a firm has no rival, or (iia) no rival has any knowledge field with greater depth than one of 
its knowledge fields and (iib) low or intermediate cognitive distance (i.e., equal to 0 or 0.5) 
from it. In fact, in these conditions a firm has nothing to learn from its rivals so it prefers 
experiential learning to vicarious learning.
If  experiential  learning  is  selected,  then  the  choice  between Experiential  Exploration  and 
Experiential Exploitation is made depending on performance. In fact, poor past performances 
and rivals' pressure give firms the impetus to undertake exploration (Tushman and Romanelli 
1985; Swaminathan and Delacroix 1991). On the contrary, average or high performances are 
most often responsible for exploitation, because: 1) they induce managers to believe they have 
gotten it  right,  2)  they induce managers  to interpret  past  performances  as a sign that  less 
vigilance and less environmental scanning or search are required, 3) they assure leaders the 
status and resources to perpetuate their power, 4) they induce managers to attribute success to 
their own actions (Miller  and Chen 1994; Lant, Milliken and Batra 1992). If performance 
cannot  be  evaluated  because  a  knowledge  field  is  not  bridging  between  other  pieces  of 
knowledge, then the choice between Experiential Exploration and Experiential Exploitation is 
made randomly, with a probability equal to the ratio of the level of poor performance to the 
level of high performance.
Experiential Exploration creates a novel knowledge field by exchanging the product or the 
market  of an existing field  with a novel one.  The newly created field has a depth drawn 
randomly from the interval between zero and the depth of the starting field. If, with the newly 
created field, the number of knowledge fields exceeds the maximum allowed, then the starting 
field is destroyed.
Experiential  Exploitation deepens the depth of an existing knowledge field  by an amount 
equal to the decay of knowledge. It merely hampers depth to decrease.
Vicarious Exploitation takes place between any pair of knowledge fields, one for the subject 
firm and one for its rival firm, such that their cognitive distance is low or intermediate (i.e., 
equal to 0 or 0.5) and the knowledge field of the rival firm has greater depth. Whenever this 
occurs, the subject firm increases the depth of its knowledge field by an amount equal to the 
depth  of  its  rival’s  field,  decreased  by  an  amount  inversely  proportional  to  geographical 
proximity, and multiplied by the complement to one of the cognitive distance between the two 
knowledge fields involved.  In practice we assumed that vicarious  exploitation takes place 
whenever a firm meets a rival with a sufficiently similar knowledge field to be understood, 
and more competent than oneself on that field.
Vicarious  exploration  has  a  different  rationale,  for  it  consists  in  the  creation  of  a  new 
knowledge field out of its observation in a rival's knowledge.  As in the case of vicarious 
exploitation, cognitive distance should not be too high (i.e., equal to 1) otherwise a rival's 
knowledge would not  be understood.  However,  cognitive  distance  should  not  be too low 
either (i.e.,  equal to 0), for a new knowledge field that  is too similar to the existing ones 
would  be  uninteresting.  Thus  we  require  intermediate  cognitive  distance  for  vicarious 
exploration to take place (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). More precisely, a rival's knowledge field 
that does not exist in one's knowledge can only be imitated if it has intermediate cognitive 
distance (i.e., equal to 0.5) with at least one of one's knowledge fields.
The flow chart
The previous building blocks are arranged together in a sequence of operations illustrated in 
figure (4). For simplicity, only two firms have been considered.
Figure 4. The sequence of operations carried out by a firm A and their relationships with the 
analogous sequence carried out by another firm B. Influences of a firm on another are marked 
by dotted arrows.
Consider firm A in figure (4). Top to bottom, the squares describe the sequence of operations 
that it carries out. First, it identifies its rivals. Subsequently, it randomly selects one of them 
and estimates the cognitive distances of its knowledge fields. Then it observes the graph of all 
knowledge fields present in the economy and calculates the performance of its own fields. 
Finally,  it  undertakes  an  action  and,  consequently,  its  own  knowledge  changes.  Before 
repeating this sequence, firm A must wait until firm B has gone through a similar sequence.
Note that the selection of rivals and the evaluation of performance depend on the actions that 
were undertaken by all other firms in the previous steps. This is the meaning of the dotted 
arrows in figure (4).
Initialization
Firms are placed on a torus obtained from a square of 100100 ×  pixels. Firms do not move on 
this space.
In order to evaluate the effects of clustering, both clustered and isolated firms are considered 
at the same time, and the number of isolated firms is set equal to the number of clustered 
firms. Isolated firms are distributed uniformly in space.
Our model allows to choose the number of clusters, the number of firms in each cluster, and 
the geographical  proximity of clusters.  The number  of clustered  firms is  obtained  by the 
product  of  the number  of firms in  a  cluster  by the number  of  clusters.  The geographical 
proximity of clusters  depends on the variance  of  a normal  distribution  of the position of 
clusters.
Firms are created with an initial wealth. Following the empirical evidence on the distribution 
of (however measured) size of firms, wealth is initially distributed according to a Zipf law 
(Axtell  2001;  Gaffeo,  Gallegati  and  Palestrini  2003).  The  values  obtained  by  the  Zipf 
distribution have been scaled by the length of the square from which the torus is derived, 
where firms are placed (see above). In fact, the absolute size of firms depends on the size of 
their market, and the size of the world where firms operate is a proxy for market size.
Firms  are  initialized  with  a  random number  of  knowledge  fields  drawn from a  uniform 
distribution. The maximum number of knowledge fields per firm is a parameter of the model. 
The initial depth of knowledge fields is drawn randomly in the [0,1] interval.
The number of different products and the number of different markets by which these initial 
knowledge fields are composed is also drawn from a uniform distribution.  The maximum 
number of initial  products  and markets  is  obtained multiplying  the number  of knowledge 
fields per firm by the number of firms.
Population Dynamics
Each  learning  action  (Experiential  Exploration,  Experiential  Exploitation,  Vicarious 
Exploration, Vicarious Exploitation) has a cost, which decreases the wealth of firm. Wealth is 
also subject  to a natural  decay according to  a fixed rate.  However,  each knowledge field 
provides a performance to its firm, which increases its wealth.
If the wealth of a firm becomes lower than the cost of a learning action,  the firm dies. A dead 
firm is immediately replaced by a new one that occupies the same geographical position. Its 
wealth and knowledge are initialized as above.
THE  EXPERIMENTS
We carried out simulations in order to compare the actions undertaken, results obtained and 
knowledge learned by clustered firms with respect to isolated firms. Since we were interested 
in long-term regularities, for any chosen parameters combination we let the model run with 
different seeds for 1,000 steps and observed its behaviour at simulation end. Reported results 
refer to 1,000 steps after allowing transitory dynamics to settle down during the initial 100 
steps.
The choice of parameters
Our simulations highlighted that clusters of firms are efficient only if they reach a critical 
mass in terms of the number of firms that they entail.  According to our model,  only if  a 
cluster entails at least 40-50 firms do these firms obtain substantial advantages with respect to 
isolated firms.
Our model is a simplification of reality so the above value should not be understood as the 
minimal size a cluster should have in the real world. However, it implies that in the real world 
a threshold exists, above which a cluster is viable.
Some experimentation with the parameters that regulate the number, size and geographical 
proximity of clusters highlighted that small but geographically proximate clusters offer the 
same advantages to their members as one large cluster (e.g., 5 clusters of 10 firms each, at a 
distance of less than 10 pixel from one another, are equivalent to one single cluster of 50 
firms). On the contrary, small clusters far from one another offer no advantage with respect to 
isolated firms.
We focused our simulations on the comparison between one single cluster of 50 firms and 
other  50  firms  scattered  around.  The  number  50  was  chosen  because  it  is  roughly  the 
minimum cluster size where the advantages of clustering become evident.
Parameters  were  chosen  making  use  of  all  available  empirical  information,  as  well  as 
constraints between parameters:
• The model makes sense if the number of firms that make bankrupt (and are replaced) is 
quite low. We found that with a decay rate of 5% and a cost of undertaking an action equal 
to 0.01 roughly 0.21% of firms are replaced at each step.
• The maximum number of knowledge fields per firm has been set at 5 in accordance with 
psychological  experiments  pointing  to  some  point  between  4  and 7  as  the  maximum 
number of items that  can be managed by a human mind (Miller  1956;  Cowan 2000). 
Though we are conscious that the above experiments are quite distant from our setting, we 
deem that they nevertheless provide an indication of the relevant order of magnitude.
• The available  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  the  average  number  of  rivals  of  firms 
located in a cluster may be in the order of 2, 3, 4 or 5; only exceptionally a firm may 
mention something like 8-10 rivals, or no rival at all (Boari, Odorici and Zamarian 2003; 
Russo and Pirani 2001). We found that by setting the maximum cognitive effort at 1.2 and 
the  similarity  threshold  at  0.2  the  simulations  are  in  good  accord  with  the  empirical 
evidence.
• The lower threshold of the depth of knowledge fields was set at 0.1. This value is much 
lower than average values attained by depth and, at the same time, sufficiently high to 
ensure that  sufficiently many low-depth fields are destroyed so the average number of 
fields is below the maximum allowed (set at 5, see above).
• The upper threshold of the depth of knowledge fields is necessary in order to avoid that a 
few fields increase their depth indefinitely. This threshold was set at 10 with the idea that, 
by setting it high, it would seldom operate. Indeed, this threshold is eventually attained 
once or twice during a simulation, and quite often it is not attained at all.
• The  threshold  of  performance  that  decides  whether  Experiential  Exploration  or 
Experiential Exploitation was set at 20% of average past performance, calculated over the 
past 10 simulation steps. Exploration is meant to be carried out in special circumstances 
(March  1991),  so  we  deem  that  this  threshold  should  be  well  below  50%  of  past 
performances.
The results
We expound the results of our model following the same sequence illustrated in figure (4).
Identification of rivals
Clustered firms have, on average, many more rivals than isolated firms (3.30 vs. 0.30 
rivals).  Moreover,  most  rivals  of  clustered  firms  are  inside  their  own  cluster  (3.28 
inside, 0.02 outside).
Cognitive Distance
Clustered  firms  are  at  a  higher  average  cognitive  distance  from their  rivals  (404% 
higher) than isolated firms are from their rivals. In other words, clustered firms watch 
rivals whose knowledge is more different from their own knowledge, than isolated firms 
do.
Performance
Our simulations confirm all empirical evidence claiming that clustered firms have an 
advantage over isolated firms. In fact, we find out that clustered firms have a higher 
performance  than  isolated  firms  (38% higher).  Consequently,  in  our  model  isolated 
firms die (and are replaced)  more often than clustered firms.
Learning Actions
Experiential  Exploitation  has  the highest  frequency (2.03),  followed by Experiential 
Exploration  (1.27),  Vicarious  Exploitation  (0.96),  and  finally  Vicarious  Exploration 
(0.02). Experiential learning is more frequent than vicarious learning, and exploitation 
is more frequent than exploration.
Knowledge Development
We introduced two indicators of knowledge development:  the number of knowledge 
fields managed by a firm (scope of knowledge), and the depth of these knowledge fields 
(depth of knowledge). On both indicators, clustered firms perform better than isolated 
firms. Clustered firms have on average more knowledge fields than isolated firms (18% 
more),  and their knowledge on these fields is deeper than the knowledge of isolated 
firms (114% deeper).
CONCLUSIONS
This study addressed the link between geographical proximity and rivalry as a cognitive and 
social  dimension  of  competition.  In  particular,  we  investigated  the  relationship  between 
geographical  proximity  and  rivalry  with  respect  to  their  impact  on  the  development  of 
knowledge by both agglomerated and isolated firms.
As we mentioned before,  the relationship between geographical proximity and rivalry has 
been  considered  a  crucial  issue  in  the  explanation  of  the  competitive  advantage  of  the 
geographical clusters and of clustered firms. In particular, geographical proximity is supposed 
to foster innovation and diffuse best practices through rivalry. However this is a presumption 
rather  than  the  result  of  empirical  investigations.  In  our  model  we take  this  presumption 
together with the thesis of those scholars that, adopting a cognitive approach to the study of 
rivalry, considered geographical proximity as a powerful cognitive tool used to “construct” 
the  market  trough  rivals’  identification  and  comparison.  In  particular,  in  our  model 
geographical  proximity  influences  rivalry  by  reducing  the  cognitive  effort  necessary  to 
entertain a rival, as well as by increasing the capability to appreciate the depth of a rival’s 
knowledge.  Rivalry  takes  the  characteristics  of  a  localized  phenomenon,  where  nearest 
competitors  may  become  rivals  because  geographical  proximity  increases  information 
availability and provides an incentive to attend to it. 
We believe  this  study can improve  our  understanding  of  the role  played  by geographical 
proximity  in  the  cognitive  representation  of  a  market.  In  particular,  according  to  our 
simulations  geographical  proximity  allows  to  expand  the  borders  of  the  constructed 
competitive environment by affecting the  scope and the depth of the knowledge developed. 
Thus, geographically clustered firms have an advantage over isolated firms with respect to 
their ability to develop knowledge and adapt it to changing circumstances. For this reason, in 
our model as in the real world, clustered firms perform better than isolated firms.
According to our simulations, clustered firms excel both in the number of knowledge fields 
and in their depth. Thus, our model suggests that it is possible for clustered firms to improve 
the scope and the depth of knowledge at the same time. It is possible because clustered firms 
observe many more rivals than isolated firms, but most importantly because clustered firms 
have almost complete access to the depth of their rivals’ knowledge, so imitation is quite 
easy.
Our  simulations  highlight  that  even  in  the  knowledge  economy,  geographical  clustering 
matters. It matters because geographical proximity helps establishing and maintaining social 
relations and, among them, rivalry relations. It is because of rivalry relations that knowledge 
is created, and it is through rivalry relations that knowledge is imitated. Our model, even in 
this basic version, reproduces these mechanisms.
Future  versions  may  include  other  aspects  of  decision-making,  such  as  heterogeneity  of 
behavioural capabilities, or different geographical arrangements of both clustered and isolated 
firms.  However,  preliminary  experiments  suggest  that  these  modifications  are  unlikely  to 
change the overall results reported above.
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